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Expanding \Choice" in School Choice
Atila Abdulkadiro glu, Yeon-Koo Che, and Yosuke Yasuda
November 28, 2008
Abstract: Truthful revelation of preferences has emerged as a desideratum
in the design of school choice programs. Gale-Shapley's deferred acceptance
mechanism is strategy-proof for students but limits their ability to communi-
cate their preference intensities. This results in ex-ante ineciency when ties
at school preferences are broken randomly. We propose a variant of deferred
acceptance mechanism which allows students to in
uence how they are treated
in ties. It maintains truthful revelation of ordinal preferences and supports a
greater scope of eciency.
Keywords: Gale-Shapley's deferred acceptance algorithm, choice-augmented
deferred acceptance, tie breaking, ex ante Pareto eciency.
1 Introduction
Public school choice has been a subject of intense research and policy debate in recent
years. The idea of expanding one's choice of school beyond his/her residence area has
broad public support, as exemplied by the number of districts that oer parental choice
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over public schools.1 Yet, how to operationalize the idea of school choice remains actively
debated.
This debate, initiated by Abdulkadiro glu and S onmez (2003), is centered around a
popular method, the \Boston" mechanism, which was used by Boston Public Schools (BPS)
until the 2004-2005 school year to assign K-12 pupils to the city schools. Under the Boston
mechanism, each school assigns its seats in the order students rank that school during
registration. Specically, each school accepts rst those who rank it the rst, and accepts
those who rank it the second only when the seats are available, and so forth. Under this
system, a student's ranking of a school matters crucially for her chance of assignment at
that school. This feature may engender strategic behavior in the families' application. For
instance, a family may not list their most preferred school as the top choice if that school
is very popular among others: Ranking it at the top will not improve their chance with
that school appreciably, but it may rather jeopardize their shot at their second, or even
less, preferred school, which could have been available to them if they had ranked it at
the top instead. This incentive to \game the system" raises diculties for families and
administrators alike.2
In 2005, BPS replaced the Boston mechanism with the student-proposing deferred ac-
ceptance (henceforth DA) mechanism. Originally proposed by David E. Gale and Lloyd
S. Shapley (1962), the DA has students apply to schools in the order they rank them, but
schools select the students based solely on their priorities with each school. Specically,
in the rst round students apply to their to top-ranked schools, and the schools select
from them according to their priorities, up to their capacities but only tentatively, and
reject the others. In the second round, those rejected by their top choice apply to their
second-ranked schools, and schools reselect from those held from the rst round and from
new applicants up to their capacities (only based on the school's ranking of them), again
tentatively, and reject the others. This process continues until no students are rejected,
at which point the tentative assignment becomes nal. A crucial dierence relative to the
Boston is that a student's ranking of a school does not aect her chance of assignment at
that school, once she applies to that school in the process. This means that the families
1Government policies that allow parents to choose schools for their children take various
forms, including interdistrict and intradistrict public school choice, oered widely across the US,
as well as open enrollment, tax credits and deductions, education savings accounts, publicly
funded vouchers and scholarships, private voucher programs, contracting with private schools, home
schooling, magnet schools, charter schools and dual enrollment. See an interactive map at
http://www.heritage.org/research/Education/SchoolChoice/SchoolChoice.cfm for a comprehensive list of
choice plans throughout the US.
2It also raises a fairness issue since not all families may be equally sophisticated at strategizing (Ab-
dulkadiro glu, Pathak, Roth, and S onmez, 2006).
2have dominant strategies to report truthfully about their rankings, a property known as
\strategyproofness" (Dubins and Freedman, 1981; Roth, 1982). For instance, top-ranking
a very popular school will not jeopardize one's chance at less preferred schools in case she
fails to get into the top school.
Besides strategyproofness, the DA mechanism is well-justied in terms of student wel-
fare, if student and school preferences do not involve indierences. Given strict preferences
on both sides, the DA algorithm produces the so-called student optimal stable matching |
a matching that is most preferred by every student among all stable matchings (Gale and
Shapley, 1962).3 By contrast, any stable matching may arise in a full-information Nash
equilibrium of the Boston mechanism (Ergin and S onmez, 2006).
In practice, however, schools do not have strict preferences over students. For instance,
the Boston public schools prioritize applicants based on whether students have siblings
attending a given school or whether they live within its walk zone. This leaves many
students in the same priority class. The resulting indierences in school preferences present
challenges in attaining the dual objectives of strategyproofness and welfare, for no strategy-
proof mechanism implements a student-optimal stable matching for every preference prole
(Erdil and Ergin, 2008). Furthermore, one has to break ties at school preferences in order
to adopt the DA mechanism, and any ineciency associated with a realized tie-breaking
cannot be removed ex post without harming students' incentives ex ante (Abdulkadiro glu,
Pathak and Roth, 2008).4 These papers provide a solution either in the way of a random
tie breaking procedure or of a method for the students to \trade" assignments ex post.
The existing literature on school choice, including these papers, is primarily concerned
with the students' ex post ordinal welfare, namely, how well a given procedure assigns
students based on their preference orderings for realized tie-breaking. Such a perspective
does not capture how well a procedure does in terms of students' ex ante welfare | i.e., on
average across all realizations of tie-breaking (not just under some realization) | and how
well it does in resolving students' con
icting interests based on their relative preference
intensities over schools.
To illustrate why ex ante welfare matters, suppose there are three students, f1;2;3g, to
be assigned to three schools, fs1;s2;s3g, each with one seat. All students are ranked into
the same priority class at every school, and students' preferences are represented by the
following von-Neumann Morgenstern (henceforth, vNM) utility values, where vi
j is student
i's vNM utility value for school sj:
3A matching is stable if no student or school can do strictly better by breaking o current matching
either unilaterally or by rematching with some other partner without making it worse o.





j = 1 4 4 3
j = 2 1 1 2
j = 3 0 0 0
Every feasible matching that assigns each student to a school is stable due to the indif-
ferences at school preferences. Since the students have the same ordinal preferences, any
such assignment is also ex post Pareto ecient. Therefore, there is no basis for comparing
dierent procedures based on the ex post welfare criterion. In particular, the stable im-
provement cycles algorithm (Erdil and Ergin, 2008), which nds a student-optimal stable
matching for every preference prole, has no bite in this example. Yet, how the students'
con
icting interests are resolved matters greatly for their ex ante welfare.
To see this, suppose rst the DA algorithm is used with ties broken randomly. Then, all
three submit true (ordinal) preferences, and they will be assigned to the schools with equal
probabilities. Hence, the students obtain expected utilities of EU1 = EU2 = EU3 = 5
3.
This assignment is ex ante Pareto-dominated by the following assignment: Assign stu-




3 = 2 > 5
3. Intuitively, starting from the random assignment,
this latter assignment executes a trading of probability shares of schools by transferring
student 3's share of schools 1 and 3 to students 1 and 2 in exchange of the latter students'
shares of school 2. Such a trade is benecial for all parties given their preference intensities.
Surprisingly, this latter, Pareto dominating, assignment arises as the unique equilibrium
of the Boston mechanism.5 Students 1 and 2 have a dominant strategy of ranking the
schools truthfully, and student 3 nds it her best response to strategically rank s2 as her
rst choice.6 The feature of the Boston mechanism crucial for this outcome is that a student
can increase her probability of getting a school simply by ranking that school higher in her
choice list. It is thus perhaps not surprising that some parents regarded this ability to
in
uence the assignment as a merit of Boston mechanism, not as its shortcoming. At a
public hearing by the BPS School Committee, a parent argued:
I'm troubled that you're considering a system that takes away the little power
that parents have to prioritize... what you call this strategizing as if strategizing
is a dirty word... (Recording from Public Hearing by the School Committee,
05-11-04).
5This does not contradict Ergin and S onmez (2006)'s nding that the Boston mechanism is (weakly)
Pareto dominated by the DA, which relies on strict preferences by the schools.
6In equilibrium, student 2 will be assigned to s2, and students 1 and 2 will be assigned between s1 and
s3 with equal probabilities, for these students will have lower priority than student 3 at school 2.
4This ability to in
uence one's treatment in a competition is suppressed in the DA, for a
school never discriminates its applicants based on where they rank that school in their
choice lists. However, it is this latter property | nondiscrimination of applicants based on
choice rankings | that yields the incentives for truthful revelation of preferences in DA.
This suggests that there is a tradeo between incentives and ex ante eciency.
Clearly, the DA is extreme in resolving this tradeo; it guarantees truthful revelation of
preferences but denies students any \say" over how they should be treated by each school.
Some parents seem to have found this feature of DA as troublesome, as one parent put it
as follows:
... if I understand the impact of Gale Shapley, and I've tried to study it and I've
met with BPS sta... I thought I understood that in fact the random number ...
[has] preference over your choices... (Recording from the BPS Public Hearing,
6-8-05).
The current paper provides some welfare justications to these sentiments expressed by the
parents, and suggests that there is a potentially better way to balance the tradeo than
either DA or Boston mechanism. Appreciable welfare gain can be obtained by oering
students simple and practical ways to signal their preference intensities, with no sacrice
on (ordinal) strategy-proofness. We propose a procedure that accomplishes this goal and
a new eciency notion that enhances our understanding and ability to compare various
assignment mechanisms on the eciency ground. The next section illustrates our proposal.
2 Choice-Augmented DA Algorithm: Illustration
We already described how the DA algorithm works when the schools' priories involve strict
preferences over students.7 Suppose now schools' priorities are characterized by weak prefer-
ences. Then, ties must be broken to generate strict school preferences for the DA algorithm
to be employed. There are two common methods of breaking ties. Single tie-breaking ran-
domly assigns every student a single lottery number to break ties at every school, whereas
multiple tie-breaking randomly assigns a distinct lottery number to each student at every
school. Clearly, a DA algorithm is well dened with respect to the strict priority list gener-
ated by either method. We refer the DA algorithms using single and multiple tie-breaking
by DA-STB and DA-MTB, respectively.
We propose an alternative way to break a tie, one that allows students to in
uence its
outcome based on their communication. The associated DA algorithm, which we refer as
Choice-Augmented Deferred Acceptance (henceforth, CADA), is described as follows:
7For a more detailed description, see Gale and Shapley (1962).
5 Step 1: All students submit ordinal preferences, plus an \auxiliary message, "naming
one's \target" school. If a student names a school for a target, she is said to have
\targeted" the school.
 Step 2: The schools' strict priorities over students are generated based on their
inherent priorities and the students' auxiliary messages, as follows. First, each stu-
dent is independently randomly assigned two lottery numbers. Call one target lottery
number and the other regular lottery number. Each school's strict priority list is then
generated as follows: (i) First consider the students in the school's highest priority
group. Within that group, rank at the top those who name the school as their target.
List them in the order of their target lottery numbers, and list below them the rest
(who didn't name that school for target) according to their regular lottery numbers.
(ii) Move to the next highest priority group, and list them below in the same fashion,
and repeat this process until all students are ranked in a strict order.
 Step 3: The students are then assigned to schools via the DA algorithm, using
each student's ordinal preferences from Step 1 and each school's strict priority list
compiled in Step 2.
To illustrate Step 2, suppose there are ve students N = f1;2;3;4;5g and two schools
S = fA;Bg, neither of which has inherent priority ordering over the students. Suppose
students 1;3 and 4 targeted A and 2 and 5 targeted B, and that students are ordered
according to their target and regular lottery numbers as follows:
T(N) : 3   5   2   1   4; R(N) : 3   4   1   2   5:
Then the priority list for school A rst reorders students f1;3;4g, who targeted that school,
based on T(N), to 3   1   4, and reorders the rest, f2;5g, based on R(N) to 2   5, which
produces a complete list for A:
PA(N) = 3   1   4   2   5:
Similarly, the priority list for B is determined as
PB(N) = 5   2   3   4   1:
The process of compiling the priority lists resembles the STB in that the same lottery
is used by dierent schools, but only within each group. Unlike STB, though, dierent
lotteries are used across dierent groups. This ensures that a student who has a bad draw
6at her target school gets a \new lease of life" with another independent draw for the other
schools.8
Clearly, the deferred acceptance feature preserves stability and the incentives to reveal
the ordinal preferences truthfully; the gaming aspect is limited to manipulating the outcome
of tie-breaking. This limited introduction of \choice signaling" can however improve upon
the DA rule in a signicant way. In the above example, the CADA implements the Pareto
superior matching: All students will submit the ordinal preferences truthfully, but 1 and 2
will target s1, and 3 will target s2. In this case, the CADA resembles the Boston mechanism.
In general, CADA is dierent from the Boston mechanism. In fact, if schools have many
priorities (so their preferences are almost \strict"), then the auxiliary message would have
little bite; thus the CADA will very much resemble the DA. Furthermore, CADA delivers a
more ecient matching without sacricing strategy-proofness. The rest of the paper makes
this sense precise. That is, we demonstrate the nature of welfare benets that CADA will
have relative to the DA algorithms, when there are suciently numerous students and
numerous school seats.
Specically, we consider a model of a \large" economy populated by a continuum of
students and a nite number of schools each with a continuum of capacities. We then
compare alternative procedures, DA-STB, DA-MTB and CADA, in terms of the scope
of eciency achieved under dierent procedures. To illustrate our approach, suppose a
procedure determines for each student the probabilities of her getting assigned to alternative
schools. Call these her shares of schools. Then the \scope of eciency" can be measured
by the set of schools whose shares cannot be traded among students in a way that benets
all the students. The bigger this set is, arguably the more ecient the outcome is, with
the outcome being fully Pareto ecient if the set coincides with the entire set of schools.
Our main result is then stated in this term: The CADA mechanism supports a greater
scope of eciency than the DA mechanisms with either tie-breaking procedure. Specically,
the DA mechanisms support ecient allocation of at most a pair of schools, whereas CADA
supports ecient allocation of a (weakly) bigger set of schools. In particular, CADA
entails ecient allocation among schools that are relatively popular|in the sense of being
oversubscribed by students in their target choice. The economics of this property closely
resembles that of competitive markets. Essentially, the students participating in CADA can
be seen as making purchasing decisions on the shares of schools. For instance, a student can
raise her share of a school, say A, by targeting it, but that lowers her priority standing in
8Although the primary reason for our choice is technical, this choice also has additional benet of
allaying a similar concern about the STB raised in the wake of the NYC redesign. One criticism against
STB was that if a student has a bad draw, then she will not have a low priority with just one or two
schools, but with every school she applies to. CADA mitigates this problem.
7other schools, say B and C, thus reducing her shares of those schools. The exact tradeos
faced by a student are determined by how many other students are targeting A, rather
than B or C. If there are many such students, then raising a share of A is \expensive," for
it requires giving up large amounts of shares of B and C. In other words, relative degrees
of congestion at dierent schools act as \prices" that regulate individuals' decisions. In a
\large" economy, students become price takers, so the resulting allocation resembles that
of competitive markets, which, as is well known, yields an ecient allocation (among the
oversubscribed schools).
In addition to showing the benet of CADA, we also argue that DA-STB is more
desirable than DA-MTB from an ex ante welfare perspective. In particular, we show that
the former supports greater scope of eciency than the latter. The choice between single
versus multiple tie-breaking has proven to be an important policy choice in high school
admissions in New York City.9 Our nding informs the choice between DA-STB and DA-
MTB in favor of the former.
The idea of CADA appears similar to the proposal by S onmez and  Unver (2003) to
imbed the DA algorithm in \course bidding" employed by some business schools. These
two proposals dier in the application, however, as well as in the nature of the inquiry: We
are interested in studying the benet of adding a \signalling" element to the DA algorithm.
By contrast, their interest is in studying the eect of adding ordinal preferences and the DA
feature to the course bidding. In a broader sense, our paper is an exercise of mechanism
design without monetary transfers, and in fact it is closer in nature to the recent ideas
of \storable votes" (Casella, 2005) and \linking decisions" (Jackson and Sonnenschein,
2007).10 Just like them, CADA \links" how a student is treated in a tie at one school
to how she is treated in a tie at another school, and this linking makes communication
credible. Clearly, applying the idea in a centralized matching is novel and dierentiates
the current paper. There is a further dierence. Jackson and Sonnenschein (forthcoming)
demonstrated the eciency of linking when (linkable) decisions tend to innity, relying
largely on the logic of the law of large numbers. To our knowledge, the current paper is the
rst to characterize the precise welfare benet of linking a xed (nite) number decisions
(albeit with continuum of agents).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We present the formal model and welfare
criterion in Section 3, provide welfare comparison across the three alternative procedures
in Section 4. Section 5 presents simulation to quantify the welfare benets of CADA.
Section 6 then considers the implication of enriching the message used in the CADA and
the robustness of our results to some students not behaving in a strategically sophisticated
9See Abdulkadiro glu, Pathak and Roth (forthcoming) for a detailed discussion.
10See also Che and Gale (1998, 2000) for the eect of budgetary limits in mechanism design.
8way. Section 7 concludes.
3 Model and Basic Analysis
3.1 Primitives
There are n  2 schools, S = f1;:::;ng, each with a unit mass of seats to ll. There
are mass n of students who are indexed by vNM values v = (v1;:::;vn) 2 V := [0;1]n
they attach to the n schools. The set of student types, V, is equipped with a measure .
We assume that  is absolutely continuous with strictly positive density in the interior of
V. The assumptions that the aggregate measure of students equal aggregate capacities of
schools and that all students nd every school acceptable are made for convenience and
will not aect our main results (see Subsection 6.5).
The students' vNM values induce their ordinal preferences. Let  := (1;:::;n) : V !
Sn be such that i(v) 6= j(v) if i 6= j and that vi(v) > vj(v) implies i < j. In other
words, (v) lists the schools in the descending order of the preferences for a student with
v, with i(v) denoting her i-th preferred school. Let  denote the set of all ordered lists
of S. Then, for each  2 ,
m := (fvj(v) = g)
represents the measure of students whose ordinal preferences are . By the full support
assumption, m > 0 for each  2 . Finally, let m := fmg2 be a prole of measures of
all ordinal types. Let M := ffmg2nj
P
2 m = ng be the set of all possible measure
proles. We say a property holds generically if it holds for a subset of m's that has the
same Lebesque measure as M.
An assignment, denoted by x, is a probability distribution over S, and this is an element
of a simplex,  := f(x1;:::;xn) 2 Rn
+j
P
i2S xi = 1g. We are primarily interested in how
a procedure determines the assignment for each student ex ante prior to conducting the
lottery. To this end, we dene an allocation to be a measurable function  := (1;:::;n) :
V 7!  such that
R
i(v)d(v) = 1 for each i 2 S, with the interpretation that student v
is assigned by mapping  = (1;:::;n) to school i with probability i(v). Let X denote
the set of all allocations.
93.2 Welfare Standards
We begin with two standard notions of ex ante welfare. To begin, we say allocation ~  2 X







and that ~  Pareto-dominates  if the former weakly dominates the latter and the inequality
of (2) is strict for a positive measure of v's. We also say ~  2 X ordinally-dominates  2 X
if the former has higher chance of assigning each student to her more preferred school than






i(v)(v); 8k = 1;:::;n   1; (2)
with the inequality being strict for some k, for a positive measure of v's.
Denition 1. (i) An allocation  2 X is Pareto ecient (PE) if there is no other
allocation in X that Pareto-dominates .
(ii) An allocation  2 X is ordinally ecient (OE) if there is no other allocation
in X that ordinally-dominates .
For our purpose, it is useful to introduce additional welfare notions, those relating to the
scope of eciency. To begin, x an assignment x 2 , and a subset K  S of schools. An
assignment ~ x 2  is said to be a within K reassignment of x if ~ xj = xj for each j 2 SnK,
and let K
x   be the set of all such reassignments. Then, a within K reallocation of an
allocation  2 X is an element of a set
X
K
 := f~  2 Xj~ (v) 2 
K
(v); a.e. v 2 Vg:
In words, a within-K reallocation of  represents an outcome of students trading their
shares of schools only within K.
Denition 2. (i) For any K  S, an ex ante allocation  2 X is Pareto ecient
(PE) within K if there is no within K reallocation of  that Pareto dominates .
(ii) For any K  S, an ex ante allocation  2 X is ordinally ecient (OE) within
K if there is no within K reallocation of  that ordinally dominates .
(iii) An allocation is pairwise PE (resp. pairwise OE) if it is PE (resp. OE) within
every K  S with jKj = 2.
10These welfare criteria are quite intuitive. Suppose the students are initially endowed
with ex ante shares  of schools but they can trade these shares amongst them. Can they
trade mutually benecially if the trading is restricted to the shares of K? The answer is
no if allocation  is PE within K. In other words, the size of the latter set represents the
restriction on the trading technologies and thus determines the scope of markets within
which eciency is realized. The bigger the set is, the less restricted the agents are in the
scope of trading, so it means a more ecient allocation. Clearly, if an allocation is Pareto
ecient within the set of all schools, then it is fully Pareto ecient. In this sense, we can
view the size of such set as a measure of eciency.
A similar intuition holds with respect to ordinal eciency. In particular, ordinal e-
ciency can be characterized by the inability to form a cycle of traders who benecially swap
their probability shares of schools. Formally, let B be the binary relation on S dened by
i B
 j () 9A  V;(A) > 0; s.t. vi > vj and j(v) > 0;8v 2 A;
and say that  admits a trading cycle within K if there exist i1;i2;:::il 2 K such that
i1 B i2;:::;il 1 B il, and il B i1. The next lemma is then adapted from Bogomolnaia and
Moulin (2001).
Lemma 1. An allocation  is OE within K  S if and only if  does not admit a trading
cycle within K.
Before proceeding further, we observe how dierent notions relate to one another.
Lemma 2. (i) If an allocation is PE (resp. OE) within K0, then it is PE (resp. OE)
within K  K0;
(ii) An allocation is OE within K  S if it is PE within K.
(iii) For any K with jKj = 2, if an allocation is OE within K, then it is PE within K.
(iv) If an allocation is OE, then it is pairwise PE.
Part (i) follows since a Pareto improving within-K reallocation constitutes a Pareto
improving within-K0 reallocation for any K0  K. Likewise, a trade cycle within any set
forms a trade cycle within its superset. Part (ii) follows since if an allocation is not ordinally
ecient within K, then it must admit a trading cycle within K, which easily implies there
being a Pareto improving reallocation. Part (iii) follows since, whenever there exist an
allocation that is not Pareto ecient within a pair of schools, there must be two groups
of agents who would benet from swapping their probability shares of these schools, from
11which the allocation must admit a trade cycle within that pair. Part (iv) then follows from
Part (iii).
These characterizations are tight. The converse of Part (iii) does not hold for any K
with jKj > 2. In the example from the introduction, the DA allocation is OE but not PE.
Likewise, an allocation that is PE within K need not be OE within any K0 % K. To see
this, imagine a situation in which an allocation is Pareto improvable upon only via a trade
cycle that includes a school in K0nK. In that case, the allocation may be PE within K yet
it will not be OE within K0.
3.3 Alternative School Choice Procedures
We consider three alternative procedures for assigning students to the schools: (1) Deferred
Acceptance with Single Tie-breaking (DA-STB), (2) Deferred Acceptance with Multiple
Tie-Breaking (DA-MTB), and (3) Choice-Augmented Deferred Acceptance (CADA). These
procedures, introduced earlier, can be extended to the continuum of students in a natural
way.
The alternative procedures dier only by the way the schools break ties. The tie-
breaking rule is well-dened for DA-STB and DA-MTB, and it follows Step 2 of Section 2
in the case of CADA, except that these rules must be extended to our continuous economy
model. The formal descriptions are provided in Appendix A. Here, we oer the following
heuristic descriptions:
 DA-STB: The mechanism draws a single random number ! 2 [0;1] for each student,
and a agent with a lower number has a higher priority than the ones with higher
numbers for each school.
 DA-MTB: For each student, the mechanism draws n independent random numbers
(!1;:::;!n) from [0;1]n. The i-th component, !i, of student's random draw then
determines her priority at school i, with a lower number draw having a higher priority
than a higher number.
 CADA: The mechanism draws two random numbers (!T;!R) 2 [0;1]2 for each stu-
dent. School i then ranks those students who targeted that school, based on their
values of !T and then ranks the others based on the values of 1 + !R (with a lower
number having a higher priority in both cases). In other words, those who didn't
target the school receive penalty score of 1.
For each procedure, the DA algorithm is readily dened using the appropriate tie-
breaker and the students' ordinal preferences as inputs. Appendix A provides a precise
12algorithm, which is sketched here. At the rst step, each student applies to her most
preferred school. Every school i tentatively admits up to unit mass from its applicants in
the order of its priority order, and reject the rest if there is any. In general, each student who
was rejected in the previous step applies to her next preferred school. Each school considers
the set of students it has tentatively admitted and the new applicants. It tentatively admits
up to unit mass from these students in the order of its priority, and rejects the rest. The
process converges when the set of students that are rejected has zero measure. Although
this process might not complete in nite time, it converges in limit, and the allocation in
the limit is well dened (see Theorem 10 of Appendix A). Further, each of the procedure
is ordinally strategy proof:
Theorem 1. (Ordinal strategy-proofness) In each of the three procedures, it is a
(weakly) dominant strategy for each student to submit her ordinal preferences truthfully.
Proof: The proof follows from Theorem 11 in Appendix A.
3.4 Characterization of Equilibria
 DA-STB and DA-MTB
In either form of DA algorithm, the resulting allocation is conveniently characterized by
the \cuto" of each school | namely, the highest lottery number that would get students
admitted by each school. Specically, the DA-STB process induces a cuto ci 2 [0;1] for
each school i such that a student who ever applies to school i gets admitted by that school
if and only if her (single) draw ! is less than ci. We rst establish that these cutos are
well dened and generically distinct.
Lemma 3. There exists a unique set of cutos fcigi2S for the schools under DA-STB and
satises ci > 0. There exists a school with cuto 1. For a generic m, the cutos are all
distinct.
Importantly, these cutos pin down the allocation of all students. To see this, consider
any student with v and a school i with a cuto ci. Suppose school j has the highest cuto
among those the student prefers over i, and its cuto is cj. If cj > ci. Then, the student
will never receive school i since whenever she has a draw ! < ci good enough for i, she
will get into school j or better. Suppose now cj < ci. Then, she will get into school i if
and only if she receives a draw ! 2 [cj;ci]. The probability of this event is precisely the
distance between the two cutos, ci   cj. Formally, let S(i;v) := fj 2 Sjvj > vig denote
the set of schools more preferred to i by type-v students. Then, the allocation S arising
from DA-STB is given by

S
i (v) := ci   max
j2S(i;v)
cj;8v;8i 2 S;
13where c; := 0.
DA-MTB is similar to DA-STB, except that each student has independent draws
(!1;:::;!n), one for each school. The DA process again induces a cuto ~ ci 2 [0;1] for
each school i such that a student who ever applies to school i gets assigned to it if and only
if her draw for school i, !i, is less than ~ ci. These cutos are well dened.
Lemma 4. There exists a unique set of cutos f~ cigi2S under DA-MTB, such that ~ ci > 0
for all i 2 S. There exists a \worst" school w such that ~ cw = 1. For a generic m, there is
single worst school.
Given the cutos f~ cigi2S, a type v-student receives school i whenever she has rejectable
draws !j > ~ cj for all school j 2 S(i;v) she prefers to i and an acceptable draw !i < ~ ci at
school i. Formally, the allocation M from DA-MTB is determined by:

M
i (v) := ~ ci
Y
j2S(i;v)
(1   ~ cj);8v;8i 2 S;
with the convention ~ c; := 0.
 CADA
As with the two other procedures, given the students' strategies on their messages,
the DA process induces cutos for the schools, one for each school in [0;2]. Of particular
interest is the equilibrium in the students' choices of messages. Given Theorem 1, the
only nontrivial part of the students' strategy concerns her \auxiliary message." Let  =
(1;:::;n) : V 7!  denote the students' mixed strategy, whereby a student with v targets
i with probability i(v). We rst establishes existence of equilibrium.
Theorem 2. (Existence) There exists an equilibrium  in pure strategies.
We say that a student applies to school i if she is rejected by all schools she lists ahead
of i in her (truthful) ordinal list. We say that a student subscribes to school i 2 S if she
targets school i and applies to that school during the DA process. (The latter event depends
on where she lists school i in her ordinal list and the other students' strategies as well as
the outcome of tie-breaking). Let  
i(v) be the probability that a student v subscribes to
school i in equilibrium. We say a school i 2 S is oversubscribed if
R
 




i(v)d(v) < 1. In equilibrium, there will be at least (generically,
exactly) one undersubscribed school which anybody can get admitted to (that is, even
when she fails to get in any other schools she listed ahead of that school). Formally, a
school w 2 S is said to be \worst" if its cuto on [0;2] equals precisely 2. Then, we have
the following lemma.
14Lemma 5. (i) Any student who prefers the worst school the most is assigned to that school
with probability 1 in equilibrium. (ii) If her most preferred school is undersubscribed but not
the worst school, then she targets that school in equilibrium. (iii) For almost every student
with v such that 1(v) 6= w, (v) =  (v) in equilibrium.
In light of Lemma 5-(iii), we shall refer to \targets a school i " simply as \subscribes
to school i."
4 Welfare Analysis of Alternative Procedures
We compare ex ante welfare of three alternative procedures in this section. We begin with
DA-STB.
Theorem 3. (DA-STB) (i) The allocation S from DA-STB is OE, and is thus pairwise
PE.
(ii) For a generic m, there exists no K  S with jKj > 2 such that S is PE within K.
Proof. The results can be proven with the aid of Figure 1.
0
!
  cs ci cj 1 
Figure 1: Ordinal eciency of DA-STB
Following Lemma 3, the cutos of the schools are deterministic, as depicted in the
gure. Suppose i BS j. Then, there must exist a positive measure of students who prefer
school i to school j but are assigned to j with positive probability. It must then follow
that ci < cj. Or else, any students who prefer school i can never be assigned to j. This is
because any such student will rank i ahead of j (by strategyproofness), so if she is rejected
by i, her draw must be ! > ci  cj, not good enough for j. Since the cutos are (at least
weakly) ordered, this means that S cannot admit a trading cycle. Hence, it is OE (and
thus pairwise PE).
To prove Part (ii), recall from Lemma 3 that the schools' cutos are generically distinct.
Take any set fi;j;kg with ci < cj < ck.
0 1 ci cj ck    
15Figure 2: Ex ante Pareto ineciency of DA-STB within fi;j;kg.
Then, by the full support assumption, there exists a positive measure of v's satisfying
vi > vj > vk > vl for all l 6= i;j;k. These students will then have the positive chance of
being assigned to each school in fi;j;kg, for their draws will land in the intervals, [0;ci],
[ci;cj] and [cj;ck], with positive probabilities. Again, given the full support assumption,
such students will all dier in their marginal rate of substitution among the three schools.
Then, just as with the motivating example, one can construct a mutually benecial trading
of shares of these schools among these students.
The result can be summarized as saying that DA-STB can yield an ordinally ecient
allocation in the large economy, but this is the most that can be expected from DA-STB,
in the sense that the scope of eciency is generically limited to (sets of) three schools.
Remark 1. With nite students, the allocation from DA-STB is ex post Pareto ecient
but is not OE, but as the number of students and school seats grow to our limiting model,
the DA-STB allocation becomes arbitrarily close to being OE. This is an implication of Che
and Kojima (2008), who show that the random priority rule (which coincides with our DA-
STB) becomes indistinguishable from the probabilistic serial mechanism (which is known to
be OE) as the economy grows large. When the schools have intrinsic priorities, the DA-STB
is not even ex post Pareto ecient (Abdulkadiroglu, Pathak and Roth (forthcoming)).
Next, consider the DA-MTB. Let school w 2 S be the worst school if its cuto under
DA-MTB is 1. There exists only one worst school for a generic m.
Theorem 4. (DA-MTB) (i) The allocation M from DA-MTB is PE within fi;wg for
each i 2 S n fwg.
(ii) Generically, there exists no K  S nfwg with jKj > 1 such that M is OE within K.
(iii) Generically, there exists no K  S with jKj > 2 such that M is OE within K.
Proof. The results (ii) and (iii) follow from the failure of ex post Pareto eciency
in the DA-MTB. Take any two schools fi;jg, neither of which is a worst school. There
is a positive measure of students whose rst and second preferred schools are i and j,
respectively (call them \type-i"). Likewise, there is a positive measure of so-called \type-
j" students rst and second preferred schools are j and i, respectively. A positive measure
of type-i students draw (!i;!j) such that !i > ~ ci and !j < ~ cj; and positive measure of
type-j students draw (!0
i;!0
j) with !0
i < ~ ci and !0
j > ~ cj (see Figure 3 below). Clearly, the
former type students are assigned to j and the latter to i, so both types of students will







0 1 ~ cj
!0
j !j
Figure 3: Pareto ineciency within fi;jg under DA-MTB.
Hence, the allocation from DA-MTB is not pairwise OE. Parts (ii) and (iii) then follow
given that generically there is only one worst rm (Lemma 4).
To prove Part (i), suppose school j = w is the worst school. Then, cj = 1. Hence,
any students who prefer j over i can never be assigned to i. Hence, the allocation does
not admit any trading cycle within fi;jg, and is thus OE within fi;jg (Lemma 1). The
allocation is then PE by Lemma 2-(iii).
Theorems 3 and 4 have an obvious implication.
Corollary 1. Assume n  3. Then, for a generic m, a PE allocation never arises from
the DA algorithm with either tie-breaking procedure.
We next turn to the CADA algorithm. The welfare properties of its allocation are
characterized as follows.
Theorem 5. (CADA) (i) An equilibrium allocation  of CADA is OE, and is thus
pairwise PE.
(ii) An equilibrium allocation of CADA is PE within the set of oversubscribed schools.
(iii) If all but one schools are oversubscribed, then the equilibrium allocation of CADA is
PE.
Theorem 5-(ii) and (iii) showcase the ex ante eciency benet associated with CADA.
As mentioned earlier, the benet parallels that of a competitive market. Essentially, CADA
supports \competitive markets" for oversubscribed schools. Each student is given a \bud-
get" of unit probability she can allocate across alternative schools for targeting. A given
unit probability can buy dierent amounts of shares for dierent schools, depending on how
many others name those schools. If a mass zi  1 students applies to school i, allocating
a unit budget can only buy a share 1=zi. Hence, the relative congestion at alternative
schools, or their relative popularity, serves as relative \prices" for these schools. In a large
economy, individual students take these prices as given, so the prices play the usual role
17of allocating resources eciently. It is therefore not surprising that the proof follows the
First Welfare Theorem.
Why are competitive markets limited only to oversubscribed schools? Why not under-
subscribed schools? The reason has to do with that one can get into an undersubscribed
school in two dierent ways: She can target it, in which case she gets assigned to it for sure;
alternatively, she can name an oversubscribed school but the school rejects her, in which
case she may still get assigned to the undersubscribed school via the usual DA channel.
This means that no single price system regulates the students' assignments to the under-
subscribed schools. Furthermore, a spill-over from the oversubscribed schools accounts for
assignment of some students to these schools. Consequently, competitive markets do not
extend to them.
Finally, Part (i) asserts ordinal eciency for CADA. At rst glance, this feature may be
a little surprising in light of the fact that dierent priority lists are used by dierent schools.
As is clear from DA-MTB, this feature is susceptible to ordinal ineciency. This is not the
case, however, in the equilibrium of CADA. To see this, observe rst that any student who
is assigned to an oversubscribed school with positive probability must strictly prefer it to
any undersubscribed school (or else she should have secured assignment to the latter school
by targeting it). This means that we cannot have j B i if school j is undersubscribed and
school i is oversubscribed. This means that if the allocation admits any trading cycle, it
must be within oversubscribed schools or within undersubscribed schools. The former is
ruled out by Part (ii) and the latter by the same argument as Theorem 3-(i).
The characterization of Theorem 5 is tight in the sense that there is generally no bigger
set that includes all oversubscribed schools and some undersubscribed school that supports
Pareto eciency.11
11To see this, suppose there are four schools, S = f1;2;3;4g, and four types of students V =
fv1;v2;v3;v4g, with (v1) = 3 "
2 , (v2) = 1+"
2 , (v3) = 3 "
2 , and (v4) = 1+"







j = 1 10 10 20 20
j = 2 3 5 9 8
j = 3 1 4 8 1
j = 4 0 0 0 0
In this case, type 1 and 3 students subscribe to school 1, and type 2 and 4 students subscribe to school 2.
More specically, the allocation  has (v1) = (v3) = ( 1
3 ";0; 2 "
2(3 "); 2 "




2(1+")). Although schools 1 and 2 are oversubscribed, this allocation is not PE within
f1;2;3g since type 1 students can trade probability shares of school 1 and 3 in exchange for probability
share at 2, with type 1 students. The allocation is not PE within f1;2;4g either, since type 3 students
can trade probability shares of school 1 and 4 in exchange for probability share at 2, with type 4 students.
Therefore f1;2g is the largest set of schools that support Pareto eciency.
18Theorem 5 refers to an endogenous property of an equilibrium, namely the set of
over/under-subscribed schools. We provide a sucient condition for this property. For
each school i 2 S, let m
i := (fv 2 Vj1(v) = ig) be the measure of students who prefer
i the most. We then say a school i is popular if m
i  1, namely, the size of the students
whose most preferred school is i is as large as its capacity.
It is easy to see that every popular school must be oversubscribed in equilibrium. Sup-
pose to the contrary that a popular school i is undersubscribed. Then, by Lemma 5-(ii),
every student with v with 1(v) = i must subscribe to i, a contradiction. Since every
popular school is oversubscribed, the next result follows from Theorem 5.
Corollary 2. Any equilibrium allocation of CADA is PE within the set of popular schools.
Corollary 2 provides a sucient condition for a school to be oversubscribed. But it is
quite possible that a non-popular school can be oversubscribed in equilibrium. In particular,
if all students have the same ordinal preferences, then there is only one popular school, so
Corollary 2 has no bite. Yet, the set of oversubscribed schools can be much bigger than
S even in this case. We can provide some insight into this question, by introducing more
structure into the preferences.
Suppose all students have the uniform ordinal preferences, with the schools indexed by
the uniform ranking. Letting VU := fv 2 Vjv1 > ::: > vng, the students will have the same














Lemma 6. Assume (VU) = (V), then at least two schools are oversubscribed in the
CADA equilibrium if (VU
2 )  1.
Full Pareto eciency may be achieved in some cases.
Corollary 3. The equilibrium allocation of CADA is PE if (i) all but one schools are
popular, or if (ii) n = 3 and all students have the same ordinal preferences and (VU
2 )  1
holds.
4.1 Comparison of Procedures
A three-way comparison emerges from the preceding analysis. It provides a formal sense
in which the CADA yields a better outcome than DA-STB, which in turn yields a better
outcome than DA-MTB. In particular, if the allocation from DA-MTB is PE within K  S,
then so is the allocation from DA-STB, although the converse does not hold; and if the
19allocation from DA-STB is PE within K0  S, then so is the allocation from CADA,
although the converse does not hold.
Specically, between the two DA algorithms, the allocation arising from DA-STB is
OE, and thus PE within any two schools, whereas the allocation from DA-MTB generically
fails to be PE within two schools unless they contain a worst school.
Meanwhile, the CADA allocation is Pareto ecient within a strictly bigger set of schools
than the allocations from DA algorithms, if there are more than two popular schools. The
following examples illustrate comparisons further.
Example 1. There are three schools, S = f1;2;3g, and three types of students V =





j = 1 5 4 1
j = 2 1 2 5
j = 3 0 0 0
It follows from Corollary 3-(i) that the allocation from CADA is Pareto ecient. More
specically, the equilibrium allocation is (v1) = (v2) = (1
2;0; 1
2) and (v3) = (0;1;0).




3) and S(v3) = (0; 2
3; 1
3).12 This allocation is not Pareto ecient since student 1
can trade probability shares of schools 1 and 3 in exchange for probability share at school
2, with student 2.
The allocation from DA-MTB is M(v1) = M(v2)  (0:392;0:274;0:333) and M(v3) 
(0:215;0:451;0:333).13 This is not PE within f1;2g.
Example 2. There are three schools, S = f1;2;3g, and two types of students V = fv1;v2g,




j = 1 3 3
j = 2 1 2
j = 3 0 0
It follows from Corollary 3-(ii) that the allocation from CADA is Pareto ecient. More
specically, the allocation  has (v1) = (1
2;0; 1
2) and (v2) = (0;1;0).
12Assuming that each student has a single uniform draw from [0;1], the cuto for school 1 is c1 = 1=2,
the cuto for school 2 is c2 = 2=3, and the one for school 3 is 1.
13Again, assuming that each student has a uniform draw from [0;1] for each school separately, the cuto
for school 1 is c1 = 5 
p
7
6  0:3923, the cuto for school 2 is c2  0:4513, and the one for school 3 is 1.




which is PE within any pair of two schools. (The result of Theorem 4-(ii) does not hold
for DA-MTB because the full-support assumption does not hold here.) This allocation is
not PE since type 1 students can trade probability shares of school 1 and 3 in exchange for
probability share at 2, with type 2 students.
Example 3. There are three schools, S = f1;2;3g, and two types of students V = fv1;v2g,




j = 1 10 10
j = 2 1 2
j = 3 0 0
In this example, the allocation arising from CADA is not PE. All students subscribe to
school 1 in equilibrium, so the allocation  is (v1) = (v2) = (1
3; 1
3; 1
3), just as with
DA-STB and DA-MTB.
In fact, if all students have the uniform ordinal preferences (i.e., (V) = (VU)), then
we can show that the CADA (weakly) Pareto-dominates the DA.
Theorem 6. Suppose all students have the same ordinal preferences. The equilibrium
allocation of CADA (weakly) Pareto dominates the allocation arising from DA with any
random tie-breaking rule.
5 Simulations
The theoretical results in the previous sections do not speak to the magnitude of eciency
gains or loses in each mechanism. In this section, we numerically investigate these questions
via simulations, which also help highlight the sources of eciency gains and loses.
In our numerical model, we have 5 schools each with 20 seats and 100 students. Student
i's vNM value for school j; ~ vij; is given by
~ vij = uj + (1   )uij
where  2 f0;0:1;0:2;0:3;0:4;0:5;0:6;0:7;0:8;0:9g, uj is common across students and uij
is specic to student i and school j: For each ; we draw fujg and fuijg uniformly ran-
domly and independently from the interval [0;1] to construct student preferences. Then
we normalize the level and the scale of each student's vNM utilities as follows:
vij = j(~ vi1;:::; ~ vi5)) :=
~ vij   min
j0 ~ vij0
max
j0 ~ vij0   min
j0 ~ vij0
21Under this normalization, the values of schools range from zero to one, with the least
preferred school worth zero and the most preferred one. Any prole of vNM values can
be represented in this way; one can simply normalize according to this formula. Further,
this normalization is invariant to ane transformation in the sense that fore each i and j,
j(~ vi1;:::; ~ vi5) = j(a~ vi1 + b;:::;a~ vi5 + b), for any a 2 R++;b 2 R.
The students' preferences become similar both ordinally and cardinally as  gets closer
to 1. In one extreme case with  = 0, students' preferences are completely uncorrelated;
in the other with  = 1, students have the same cardinal preferences. Given a cardinal
utility prole, we simulate DA-STB and DA-MTB, compute a complete information Nash
equilibrium of CADA and the resulting CADA outcome. We repeat that 100 times by
drawing a new set of vNM utility values for each . In addition, we solve for a rst-best
solution, which is a utilitarian maximum for each set of vNM utility values. We then
compute average welfare under each mechanism, i.e., the total expected utilities realized
under a given mechanism averaged over 100 drawings.14
In Figure 4, we compare the three mechanisms to the rst best solution, the utilitarian
ecient allocation. We plot the welfare of each mechanism as the percentage of the welfare
at the rst best solution. Two observations emerge from this gure. First, the welfare
generated by each mechanism follows a U-shaped pattern. Second, CADA outperforms DA-
STB, which outperforms DA-MTB at every value of  and the gap in performance between
CADA and the other mechanisms is bigger for larger values of . All three mechanisms
perform almost equally well and produce about 96% of the rst-best welfare when  = 0.
In this case, students have virtually no con
icts of interests, and each mechanism more
or less assigns students to their rst choice schools. The welfare gain of CADA increases
as  increases. This is due to the fact that competition for one's rst choice increases as
 increases. In those instances, who gets her rst choice matters. While DA-STB and
DA-MTB determine this purely randomly, CADA does so based on students' messages.
Intuitively, if a student's vNM value for a school increases, the likelihood of the student
targeting that school in an equilibrium of CADA, therefore the likelihood of her getting
that school, increases. This feature of CADA contributes to its welfare gain. DA-STB and
DA-MTB start catching up with CADA at  = 0:9. In this case, students have almost the
same cardinal preferences, so any matching is close to being ex ante ecient. At  = 0:9,
CADA achieves 95.5% of the rst best welfare, whereas DA-STB achieves 92.2%.15
Figure 5 gives further insight into the workings of the mechanisms. It shows the per-
14See Appendix C for a detailed explanation for the simulations and the computation of the numbers for
the gures.
15At the extreme case of  = 1; preferences are the same so every matching is ecient and the welfare
generated by each mechanism is equal to the rst best welfare.
22centage of students getting their rst choices under each mechanism. First, DA-MTB
assigns signicantly smaller numbers to rst choices. This is due to the articial stability
constraints created by multiple tie breaking, which also explains the bigger welfare loss
associated with DA-MTB. The patterns for CADA and DA-STB are more revealing. In
particular, both assign almost the same number of students to their rst choices for each
value of . That is, whereas the poor welfare performance of DA-MTB is explained by the
low number of students getting their rst choices, the dierence between the other two is
explainable not by how many students, but rather by which students are assigned to their
rst choices.
This is illustrated more clearly by Figure 6, which shows the the ratio of the mean utility
of those who get their k-th choice under CADA to the mean utility of those who get their
k-th choice under DA-STB at the realized matchings, for k = 1;2;3: Specically, those who
get their k-th choice achieve a higher utility under CADA than under DA-STB for each
k = 1;2;3: The utility gain is particularly more pronounced for the receivers of their second
or third choices. This simply re
ects the feature of CADA in assigning students based on
their preference intensities: under CADA, those who have less to lose from the second-
or third-best choices are more likely to target those schools, and are thus more likely to
comprise such assignments. Figure 6 shows that the number of oversubscribed schools is
larger on average than the number of popular schools. Note that the average number of
oversubscribed schools is larger than 2 at all values of . Recalling our Theorems 3 and
5, DA-STB is never Pareto ecient within a set of more than 2 schools, whereas CADA is
Pareto ecient within the set of oversubscribed schools. Figure 6 thus shows the scope of
eciency achieved by CADA can be much higher than is predicted by Corollary 2. It is also
worth noting that the average number of oversubscribed schools exceeds 3 for   0:4: This
implies that there are often 4 oversubscribed schools. At those instances, CADA achieves
full Pareto eciency.
The equilibrium behavior of students in Figure 7 shows that more students target their
lower ranked schools as  gets closer to 1. This monotone pattern in behavior can be
explained by the extent of competition over schools. As  increases, more students have
the same school as rst choice. Therefore competition for one's rst choice becomes more
intense. This gives students incentive to target their second, third and even fourth choices
in CADA.16 This also explains the widening gap between the number of popular schools
and the number of oversubscribed schools as  goes to 1 in Figure 7.
As mentioned in the introduction, some schools have (non-strict) priorities. We nu-
merically investigate such an environment. To this end, we introduce schools priorities as
follows: Each school has two priority classes, high priority and low priority. For each pref-
16Note that it is never optimal to target the fth (last) choice.
23erence prole above, we assume that 50 students have high priority in their rst choice and
low priority in their other choices, 30 students have high priority in their second choice and
low priority in their other choices, and 20 students have high priority in their third choice
and low priority in their other choices.17 For convenience, if a student has high priority at
a school, we refer to that school as that student's neighborhood school.
We simulate both DA-STB and CADA in this environment. Schools' priorities do not
coincide with students' preferences, so both mechanism fail to produce ecient outcome or
even student optimal allocation in the presence of school priorities. Erdil and Ergin (2008)
proposed a way to attain constrained eciency subject to respecting school priorities, via
performing so-called stable improvement cycles after an initial DA assignment. We thus
simulate this algorithm, referred to as DASTB+SIC, to see how it compares with the
CADA.
In Figure 9, we compare CADA, DA-STB and DA-STB+SIC again measured as per-
centage of rst-best welfare (ignoring priorities). Again, CADA outperforms DA-STB for
all values of . Since DA-STB+SIC is designed to attain a student optimal outcome, while
CADA and DA-STB are not, the former is expected to outperform the latter. This is in-
deed the case up to  = 0:4. When the students' preferences are (ordinally) more similar,
CADA catches up with DASTB+SIC (at around  = 0:5) and outperforms it as  gets
large. In the latter case, the ordinal eciency becomes less relevant, so cardinal eciency
matters more. In particular, when  is close to 1, every matching is close to being student
optimal so that the stable improvement cycles algorithm has little bite. Hence, CADA
allocates schools more eciently than DASTB+SIC does for higher values of .
DASTB+SIC assigns more students to their rst choices than CADA does for low values
of . The dierence vanishes for large values of . The equilibrium behavior of students
under CADA is similar; more and more students target their lower ranked schools as 
gets bigger.18 However, Figure 10 shows that more students utilize their target choice
for their neighborhood schools. The intuition behind this result is subtle. As more and
more students target their lower ranked choices in equilibrium, it becomes tougher to
compete for lower ranked schools especially for students who do not have high priority in
their lower ranked schools. In turn, those students pick their rst choice more frequently,
which is their neighborhood school. However, this increases the competition at rst choice
schools for students whose rst choices are not their neighborhood schools. In turn, they
target their lower-ranked neighborhood schools. In equilibrium, more students target their
neighborhood schools for larger values of .
In summary, some similarity among preferences is expected in real-life school choice
17This assumption is in line with empirical observation in Boston.
18Additional graphs are available from the authors upon request.
24programs. In those instances, student optimality, therefore DASTB+SIC, has little bite in
improving ex ante eciency. CADA allocates schools more eciently from an ex ante stand-
point even though its outcome may be inecient ex post. CADA achieves this eciency
gain without harming ordinal incentives, whereas ex post student optimality necessarily
implies the loss of strategy-proofness.
6 Discussion
6.1 Enriching the Auxiliary Message
The auxiliary message can be expanded to include more than one school, perhaps at the
expense of some practicality. In general, the auxiliary message can include a rank order of
schools up to k  n, with the tie broken in the lexicographic fashion according to this rank
order: A student is reordered to be ahead of another one at the priority list of school i 2 S
if and only if the former ranks it higher than the latter in the auxiliary message. We call
the associated CADA a CADA of degree k.
It is worth noting that the CADA of degree n coincides with the Boston mechanism if
the schools have no priorities and if all students have the same ordinal preferences. Such
an enriching of the auxiliary message does not alter the qualitative features of CADA. In
particular, an argument analogous to that of Theorem 6 applies to CADA of any degree,
which has a rather surprising implication:
Theorem 7. If all students have the same ordinal preferences and the schools have no
priorities, then the Boston mechanism weakly Pareto dominates the DA algorithm.
Expanding the auxiliary message may complicate the deliberation on the part of stu-
dents and may be practically cumbersome. The beauty of CADA is that the auxiliary
message can be kept as simple as practically manageable, if necessary, to k = 1 as has been
assumed before. What are the benets from adding more schools in the message? Some
observations are easy to make. First, enriching the message does not generally guarantee
full Pareto eciency. Consider Example 3 again. Allowing the students to include the
second message, or even a third message, does not make any dierence: All students will
pick school 1 as their rst target and school 2 as their second target, and the precisely the
same allocation will arise in equilibrium (which also coincides with one arising from DA-
STB). The enriching of message can have a second-order eect, though. The rst example
illustrates the benet side.
25Example 4. (More is better) There are 4 schools, S = f1;2;3;4g, and two types of




j = 1 20 20
j = 2 4 3
j = 3 1 2
j = 4 0 0
With CADA of degree 1, all students subscribe to school 1, so the allocation is completely




4), j = 1;2. With CADA of degree 2, all students pick
school 1 as their rst target; but type 1 students pick school 2 as their second target whereas





3) and (v2) = (1
4;0; 3
4;0). This allocation  Pareto dominates ,
although the former is not Pareto ecient.
A richer message need not be always better. A richer message space generates more
opportunities for a student to self-select at dierent tiers of schools. But the alternative
opportunities may work as substitutes and militate each other. For instance, an opportunity
to self select at a lower tier of schools may reduce a student's incentive to self select at a
higher tier of schools, even though the latter kinds of self selection may be more important
from the social welfare perspective. This kind of \crowding out" arises in the next example.
Example 5. (More is worse) There are 4 schools, S = f1;2;3;4g, and two types of




j = 1 12 8
j = 2 2 4
j = 3 1 3
j = 4 0 0
Consider rst CADA of degree 1. Here, all type 1 students choose school 1 as their
target, and all type 2 students choose school 2 as their target. In other words, the latter type




3) and (v2) = (0;1;0;0). The expected utilities are EU1 = 4:33 and EU2 = 4.
In fact, this allocation is Pareto optimal.
Suppose now CADA of degree 2 is used. In equilibrium, type 1 students choose school
1 and 2 as their rst and second targets, respectively. Meanwhile, type 2 students choose
school 1 (instead of school 2!) as their rst target and school 3 as their second target. Here,
26the opportunity for type 2 students to self select at a lower tier school (school 3) blunts their





3) and (v2) = (1
4;0; 3





= 4:25. This allocation is not PE since type 2 students can trade probability shares
of school 1 and 3 in exchange for probability share at 2, with type 1 students.
Even though  does not Pareto dominate , the former is PE whereas the latter is not.
Further, the former is superior to the latter in the Utilitarian sense (recall that students'
payos are normalized so that they aggregate to the same value for both types): the former
gives aggregate utilities of 17, the highest possible level, whereas the latter gives 15:5 (which
is 0:5 above the level that would arise from random assignment).
The last example suggests that the benet from enriching the message space is not
unambiguous. This is a potentially important point. In practice, expanding a message space
adds a burden on the parents to be strategically more sophisticated. Hence avoiding such
a demand for strategic sophistication is an important quality for a procedure to succeed.
This makes the simple CADA (i.e., of degree 1) quite appealing. That this practical benet
may not even involve a welfare sacrice is reassuring about the simple CADA.
6.2 Strategic Naivety
Since CADA involves some \gaming" aspect, albeit limited to tie-breaking, a natural con-
cern is that not all families may be strategically competent. This concern has arisen in
the context of the Boston mechanism. It has been observed that some signicant percent-
age of families have played suboptimal strategies, for instance, wasting their second top
choices to schools that are so popular that students can get in those schools only by listing
them as top choices. Such mistakes may arise because of the lack of knowledge about
how the system works or the diculty with assessing how popular schools are. The same
concern may arise with respect to CADA, in that some families may not understand well
the role the auxiliary message plays in the system and/or they may not judge accurately
how over/undersubscribed various schools will turn out.
It is thus important to investigate how the CADA will perform when some families
are not strategically sophisticated. To this end, we consider students who are \naive" in
the sense that they always target their most preferred schools in the auxiliary message.
Targeting the most preferred school appears to be a simple, but reasonable, choice when
she/he is unsure about the popularity of alternative schools or unclear about the role the
auxiliary message plays in the assignment. Such a strategy will indeed be a best response
for many situations, particularly if the rst choice is distinctively better than the rest of the
choices, so it could be a good approximation. We assume that there is a positive measure of
27students who are naive in this way, and the others know the presence of these students and
their behavior, and respond optimally against them. Surprisingly, the presence of naive
students do not aect the main welfare results in a qualitative way.
Theorem 8. In the presence of naive students, the equilibrium allocation of CADA satises
the following properties:
(i) The allocation is OE, and is thus pairwise PE.
(ii) The allocation is PE within the set K of oversubscribed schools.
(iii) If every student is naive, then the allocation is PE within K [ flg for any undersub-
scribed school l 2 J := SnK.
Theorem 8-(i) and (ii) are qualitatively the same as the corresponding parts of Theorem
5, except for Part (iii) of Theorem 5.19 Of course, the set of oversubscribed schools need
not be the same when some fraction of students are naive, so (even) these results do not
admit direct comparison between the case of fully rational students and the current case.
In particular, Theorem 8-(iii) does not mean that the Pareto ecient set of schools is larger
when all students are naive than when there are no naive students. When every student
is naive, the set of oversubscribed schools coincides with the set of popular schools. When
no students are naive, however, the former is always weakly larger than the latter and can
be strictly larger (Recall Examples 1 and 3).
Nevertheless, the eciency statement is very similar. In particular, Lemma 5-(ii) re-
mains valid in the current context, implying that any popular schools must be oversub-
scribed here as well. Hence, the same conclusion as Corollary 2 holds.
Corollary 4. In the presence of naive students, the equilibrium allocation of CADA is PE
within the set S of popular schools.
19Suppose there are three schools, S = f1;2;3g, and three types of students V = fv1;v2;v3g, with





j = 1 10 10 10
j = 2 1 8 9
j = 3 0 0 0
Suppose type 1 and 2 students are strategically sophisticated while type 3 students are all naive. In this
case, type 1 and 3 students submit school 1, and type 2 students target school 2. Then, the resulting
ex ante allocation has (v1) = (v3) = (1
2;0; 1
2) and (v2) = (0;1;0). Although schools 1 and 2 are
oversubscribed, this allocation is not PE since it will be Pareto improving for type 2 students to trade
probability share of school 2 in exchange for probability shares at schools 1 and 3, with type 3 (naive)
students. Therefore, Theorem 5-(iii) does not extend to the case in which we have both strategically
sophisticated and naive students.
28We also investigate numerically the impact of naive players on average welfare via
simulations. To this end, we assume that a certain number of students play naively and
target their rst choice schools. Other students play their best responses in a complete
information Nash equilibrium. We run this simulation with 50 naive students, with 75
naive students and with 100 (all) naive students. Figure 11 reports the average percentage
welfare with respect to the rst best with zero, 50, 75 and 100 (all) naive students. The
welfare patterns are similar. A bigger number of strategic players yields a more ecient
outcome. It is worth noting that CADA continues to outperform DA-STB even when all
players are naive.
6.3 CADA with \Safety Valve"
The preceding subsection has seen that the main welfare property of CADA remains valid
even when an arbitrary proportion of the student population behaves naively. This does
not mean, however, that naive students are not disadvantaged by the others who may make
strategic use of the message. It thus makes sense to provide an extra safeguard to those
who may feel unsure about how to play the CADA game. This can be done by augmenting
the message space to allow for an \exit option" and to treat those who invoke such an
option as if they are participating in the standard DA algorithm. Specically, the CADA
can be modied as follows.
 All students submit ordinal preferences and auxiliary messages. In the auxiliary
message, a student can name a target school or say \Opt Out."
 Random ordering of students are generated according to the standard method (e.g.,
STB). Then, run DA-STB using this priority list. (If a school has inherent priorities,
the random list is used only to break a tie within the same priority class.) Assign
those who have picked \Opt Out" according to this procedure.
 Assign the remaining students to the remaining seats, using the CADA algorithm.
Specically, construct the choice-augmented priority list for each school, as described
before (using two random lists). Then, the assignment is made via the DA algorithm
using the choice-augmented priority.
Clearly, this modied algorithm gives each student the option of achieving precisely the
same lottery of assignments as she receives from the DA-STB. But she can choose to send
an active signal and do better.
Theorem 9. The CADA with the safety option makes every student (weakly) better o
than she is from the DA-STB.
296.4 Dynamic Implementation
As noted, the welfare benet of CADA originates from the competitive markets it induces.
Unlike the usual markets where there are explicit prices, however, in the CADA-generated
markets, students' beliefs about the relative popularity of schools act as the prices. Hence,
for the CADA to have the desirable welfare benet, their beliefs must be reasonably accu-
rate. In practice, the students' preferences tend to re
ect the reputations that schools have
developed; thus, as long as the school reputations are stable, they can serve as reasonably
good proxies for the prices. Nevertheless, the students may not share the same beliefs and
the beliefs may not be accurate, in which case CADA procedure will not implement the
CADA equilibrium precisely.
The CADA equilibrium can be implemented more precisely by making the (shadow)
prices more explicit and by facilitating students' ability to respond to them. Suppose, after
submitting their ordinal preferences (which is an once and for all decision), the students
can be asked to submit their auxiliary message in a dynamic fashion.
In Round 1, the students submit the names of their target schools. At the end of Round
1, the students are allowed to see the population distribution of target school choices.20 In
Round m  2, the students are allowed to change their auxiliary messages. If the number
of students who have changed their auxiliary messages from the previous round is less than
some (pre-specied) threshold, then their choices in Round m become nal, and CADA is
run, just as before, to produce a matching. If the number exceeds the threshold, then the
population distribution of choices is announced, and they move on to Round m + 1.
Under this dynamic mechanism, a student's choice matters only when most of the other
students do not alter their choices. It is thus optimal for students to simply best respond
to the announced distribution of population choices in the previous round. Clearly, the
resulting best-response dynamics will lead to a Nash equilibrium (i.e., a CADA equilibrium
discussed earlier), whenever the process converges. Although our dynamic process likely
converges in practice, activity rules can be added to facilitate the convergence. For instance,
limit cycles can be eliminated by preventing some small fraction of randomly selected
students from returning back to their original choices after deviating from them once or
twice.
20Alternatively, the clearinghouse may compute and display the probabilities of assignment to dierent
schools that would arise (from the CADA) from each choice, assuming that no other student alters her
auxiliary message.
306.5 Excess Capacities and Outside Options
Thus far, we have made simplifying assumptions that the aggregate measure of students
equal the aggregate capacities of public schools and that all students nd each public
school acceptable. These assumptions may not hold in reality. While public schools must
guarantee seats to students, all the seats need not be lled. And some students may nd
outside options, such as home or private schooling, better than some public schools. One
can relax these assumptions by letting the aggregate capacities to be (weakly) greater than n
and by endowing each student an outside option with value drawn from [0;1].21 Extending
the model in this way entails virtually no changes in the main tenet of our paper. All
theoretical results continue to hold in this relaxed environment. A subtle dierence arises
since, with excess capacities, there may be more than one worst school under DA-MTB,
so its allocation may become PE within more pairs of schools. Nevertheless, Theorems 1-9
remain valid. For instance, the DA-STB allocation is ordinally ecient; and the CADA
allocation is ordinally ecient, and Pareto ecient within oversubscribed, and thus popular,
schools.
6.6 Intrinsic Priorities
The theoretical part of the paper has assumed that schools have no intrinsic priorities. As-
suming that schools are indierent to all students enabled us to focus on the role of school
choice mechanisms in resolving con
icts and to obtain a clear welfare characterizations
across mechanisms. In practice, schools do have (coarse) priorities. Although accommo-
dating priorities in our model seems beyond the scope of the current paper, our simulation
shows that the benet of CADA extends to such an environment especially if the students'
preferences have sucient commonality. How the theoretical results will extend to this
environment remains an interesting open question.22
21This modeling approach implicitly assumes the outside options to have unlimited capacities, which
may not accurately re
ect the scarcity of outside option such as private schooling.
22At least one part of the result seems easily extendable with a slight modication of CADA. Suppose
students can be partitioned into separate \priority" groups so that each group has the same intrinsic
priority prole; that is, students in each priority group have the same intrinsic priority at every school.
One can then apply the CADA tie-breaking with respect to each priority group. In other words, tie-
breaking standings of students within each priority group are determined by their auxiliary messages. This
modied CADA ensures that the targeting by the members of each priority group has no \externalities" on
the tie-breaking of students in a dierent group. It is straightforward to check that Theorem 6 generalizes
as follows: The (modied) CADA allocation weakly Pareto dominates the DA allocation if students within
each priority group have the same ordinal preferences.
317 Conclusion
In this paper, we propose a new deferred acceptance procedure in which students are al-
lowed, via signaling of their preferences, to in
uence how they are treated in a tie for a
school. This new procedure, choice-augmented DA algorithm (CADA), makes the most of
two existing procedures, the Gale-Shapely's deferred acceptance algorithm (DA) and the
Boston mechanism. While the DA achieves the strategyproofness, an important property
in the design of school choice programs, it limits students' abilities to communicate their
preference intensities, which entails an ex ante inecient allocation when schools are indif-
ferent among students with the same ordinal preferences. The Boston mechanism, on the
other hand, is responsive to the agents' cardinal preferences and may achieve more ecient
allocation than the DA, but fails to satisfy strategyproofness. We show that, by allow-
ing students to in
uence tie-breaking via additional communication, CADA implements a
more ecient ex ante allocation than the standard DA algorithms, without sacricing the
strategyproofness of ordinal preferences.
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33Appendix A: Extensions of Algorithms to the Contin-
uous Environment
It is convenient to explicitly model the randomizing device used to break the ties. For our
purpose, it is sucient to consider a vector ! = (!1;:::;!n) 2 [0;n]n =: 
 of uniformly
and independently generated numbers. (The vector of ! will be suciently rich enough to
model the procedures we study.) Formally, we augment the type space by incorporating
the random draw to V  
 =: , with its generic element denoted  := (v;!), and endow
it with a product measure  =   1  :::  n, where i is a uniform measure satisfying
([0;!i]) = !i for each !i 2 [0;1]. This formalism avoids appealing to the law of large
numbers (on the continuum of agents), by ensuring that a fraction !i of the student mass
draws !i or less on each i-th random variable. A student of type  = (v;!) is then
interpreted as having values v and drawing a vector !. The student never observes !, so
her action required by the procedure will be measurable with respect to only v; whereas
(part or all of) ! component is \discovered" by the schools for their use in tie-breaking.
An ex post allocation is a measurable function   := ( 1;:::; n) :  7!  such that
 i() 2 f0;1g and that
R
 i()(d) = 1 for each i 2 S. Namely,   assigns a student with
v to school j upon drawing ! such that  j(v;!) = 1. Let Y be the set of all ex post
allocations. Later, we shall describe how each procedure generates an ex post allocation.
Some procedures may not use the entire vector of !, so the ex post allocation they produce
may be measurable with respect to only some components of !.
We dene the alternative DA procedures here.
Ordinal preferences. In any DA algorithm, every student submits a ranking of
schools. Formally, students' ordinal preferences are represented by a measurable function
P :  ! n, where P(v;!) 2 n is an ordered list of n schools (ordered not necessarily
according to true preferences). Since the ! is unobserved by the students (at least at the
time of submitting the ordinal preferences), we require that P(v;!) = P(v0;!0) whenever
v = v0. We say a DA algorithm is ordinally strategy-proof if it is a (weak) dominant
strategy for each student with v to choose P(v;!) = n(v).
School priorities (tie-breaking rules). We introduce a tie-breaker function which
determines the priority of each student for each school as a function of the random draw
(as well as their auxiliary message in the case of CADA), in the event of a tie. Formally,
tie-breaker function for school i is a bounded measurable function Fi :  7! R, such that a
student 0 is interpreted as having a higher priority than student  if Fi(0) < Fi(). A tie-
breaker is a prole F = fFi : i 2 Sg of tie-breaker functions. Specically, the tie-breakers
for DA-STB, DA-MTB, and CADA are determined as follows:
34 DA-STB: The STB rule uses the same tie-breaker function for all schools. This is
modeled by a tie-breaker with
Fi(v;!1;:::;!n) = !1;
 = (v;!1;:::;!n), for every school i 2 S. In other words, a draw's draw !1 serves as
a priority number for all schools. Heuristically, a real number !1 is drawn randomly
from an interval [0;1], for each student, which then serves as her priority score.23
 DA-MTB: The MTB rule produce a randomly and independently drawn priority list
for each school. This is modeled by a tie-breaker, with
Fi(v;!1;:::;!n) = !i;
for i 2 S and for each  = (v;!1;:::;!n). In other words, for each student, a vector
(!1;:::;!n) of independent draws determines her priority scores at dierent schools.
 CADA: In CADA, each student sends an auxiliary message of a target school (in
addition to their ordinal preferences over schools). Given a (measurable) strategy
prole s : V ! S determining the auxiliary message for each intrinsic type v, the
tie-breaker function for school i is given by
Fi(v;!1;:::;!n) =
(
!1 if s(v) = i
1 + !2 if s(v) 6= i
That is, under Fi; ties are broken rst in favor of students who target i, within them
according to the random draw !1, and then ties among the rest are broken according
to a random draw !2 + n (where n act as a \penalty score" n). Clearly, Fi is a
measurable function since !1 and s are measurable.
Denition of DA algorithms: Given ordinal preferences P and a tie-breaker F =
fFi : i 2 Sg, a DA algorithm is dened as follows. First, we dene a measurable function
ChFi over subsets of  as the set of best ranked students for school i 2 S according to Fi
from a given set up to the capacity. Formally, for any measurable X  ; let
ChFi(X) := supfY  Xj(Y )  1;Fi() < Fi(
0);8 2 Y;
0 2 XnY g
denote the set of students chosen from X such that the set does not exceed the capacity
and that the chosen students have a higher priority than those not chosen.
23This heuristics invokes a law of large numbers, but our formal method does not rely on it for we assume
a well-behaved randomization device.
35Next, we dene the DAF (deferred acceptance) mapping. Consider rst a mapping
Q :  ! , where Q() is an ordered list of any k  n schools. (Recall P() is a special
case involving the full set of schools.) The DA mapping, Q0 = DAF(Q) 2  is determined
as follows. Every student with  applies to her most preferred school in Q(): Every school
i (tentatively) admits from its applicants in the order of Fi: If all of its seats are assigned,
it rejects the remaining applicants. If a student  is rejected by i, Q0() is obtained from
Q() by deleting i in Q(): If a student  is not rejected, then Q0() = Q(): More formally,
let Ti(Q) = f 2  : i is ranked rst in Q()g be the set of students that rank i as rst
choice. Note that Ti(Q) is measurable. Then each school i admits students in ChFi(Ti(Q))
and rejects students in Ti(Q)nChFi(Ti(Q)). If  2 Ti(Q)nChFi(Ti(Q)) for some i 2 S; then
Q0() is obtained from Q() by deleting i from the top of Q(); otherwise Q0() = Q():
Since Q is a measurable function, Q0 is also measurable.
Repeated application of the DAF mapping gives us the DA algorithm. That is, given
a problem (P;F); let Q0 = P and dene Qt = DAF(Qt 1) for t > 0: Then Qt converges
almost everywhere to some measurable Q (Theorem 10 below). The matching can be then
found by assigning  to its top choice of Q(). Formally, dene a mapping  (P;F) :  7! 
such that  
(P;F)
i () = 1 if i is the top choice of Q(), and  
(P;F)
i () = 0 otherwise. Since
the schools' capacities are respected in each round and also in the limit, the mapping must
be an ex post allocation.
We present two main results:
Well-denedness of the Procedure. The existence of  (P;F) follows from the next
theorem.
Theorem 10. For every (P;F); DAt
F(P) converges almost everywhere to some measurable
Q :  ! :
Proof. Dene the set of rejected students as Rt = f :  2 Ti(Qt)nChFi(Ti(Qt)) for some
i 2 Sg: Then (Rt) goes to zero as t goes to innity. Otherwise, if (Rt)   > 0 for all
t; all the schools in every student's preference would be deleted in nite time because of
niteness of the number of schools, which in turn would imply that (Rt) goes to zero, a
contradiction. Therefore, DAt
F(P) converges almost everywhere to some Q: Since every
Qt = DAt
F(P) is measurable, Q is also measurable.
Ordinal Strategy-proofness. Fix arbitrary ordinal preferences P. Let P v : Vnfvg !
n denote the ordinal preferences of all students but v determined by P: Recall that
n(v) 2 n represents the truthful ordinal preference induced by v, that is n(v) lists i
before j if and only if vi > vj: To simplify the notation, let  P :=  (P;F), with F sup-
pressed, and let   :=  (n;P [];F) denote the matching outcome for any given type when it
36submits its ordinal preferences truthfully and the others report P. When students report
P, a student with type v receives expected utility of
E!





Theorem 11. For every (P;F); it is a (weak) dominant strategy for every student to submit
her ordinal preferences truthfully to DA, that is, for all v 2 V, P,
E! [v   
(v;!)]  E!





Proof. It suces to show that, for all  = (v;!),
v   
(v;!)  v   
P(v;!):
Suppose to the contrary that
v   
(v;!) < v   
P(v;!); (3)
for some  = (v;!) and P. We show that there exists a nite many-to-one matching
problem for which a DA algorithm fails strategy-proofness, which will then constitute a
contradiction to the standard strategy-proofness result (Dubins and Friedman, 1981; Roth,
1982).
To begin, x any K 2 N+; and construct a discretization of (P;F) for  as follows: For
every z = (z1;:::;zn) and y = (y1;:::;yn) where zi;yj 2 f0;:::;Kg, consider a set
z;y =

(~ v; ~ !) 2  :
zi
K












Let K;min = min
z;y
(z;y), and let #z;y be the integer part of
(z;y)
K;min .
Pick #z;y students in total from every set z;y at random without repetition. Let
flg denote the set of students that are picked. If
jflgj
n is not an integer, pick additional
students from the larger sets until obtaining an integer
jflgj
n : Note that the number of
additional students to be picked this way is less than n and n is xed, therefore this will be
negligible in the limit as K goes to innity. Now consider the problem in which the set flg
of students are to be assigned to a set S of schools each with capacity
jflgj
n : Each student
l = (vl;!l)'s strict ordinal preference is given by P(l): The schools' strict preferences are
given by F: Denote this problem by (flg;S;P;F)K, and the associated ex post allocation
 P
K. As K goes to innity, (flg;S;P;F)K approximate (;S;P;F) arbitrarily closely.
Hence,  P
K !a:e  P and  
n(v);P v
K !a:e:   as K ! 1. Hence, if (3) holds, then there
exists K such that
v   

K(v;!) < v   
P
K(v;!):
This contradicts the fact that, in every nite problem, submitting true preferences to the
student-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism is a dominant strategy for every student
(Dubins and Friedman, 1981; Roth, 1982).
37Appendix B: Proofs of the Main Results
Proof of Lemma 3. For any S0  S and i 2 S0, let mi(S0) := (fvjvi  vj; 8j 2 S0g)
be the measure of students who prefer i the most among S0. The cutos of the schools are
then dened recursively as follows. Let ^ S0 = S ^ c0 = 0, and ^ x0
i = 0 for every i 2 S. Given
^ S0;^ c0; f^ x0
igi2S;:::; ^ St 1;^ ct 1;f^ x
t 1









i + mi(^ S
t 1)
 












t = ^ S







i = ^ x
t 1




t   ^ c
t 1
: (7)
Each recursion step t determines the cuto of school(s) given cutos f^ c0;:::;^ ct 1g. Students
with draw ! > ^ ct 1 can never be assigned to schools SnSt 1. For each school i 2 St 1 with
remaining capacity, a fraction ^ x
t 1
i is claimed by students with draws less than ^ ct 1, so only
fraction 1   ^ x
t 1
i of seats can be assigned to students with draws ! > ^ ct 1. If school i has
the next highest cuto, ^ ct, then the remaining capacity 1   ^ x
t 1
i must equal the measure
of those students who prefer i the most among St 1 and have drawn numbers in [^ ct 1;^ ct].
This, and the fact that school i has cuto ^ ct, imply (4) and (5). The recursion denition
implies (6) and (7).
The recursive equations uniquely determine the set of cutos f^ c0;:::;^ ckg, where k  n.
The cuto for school i 2 S is then given by ci := f^ ctj^ ct
i = ^ ctg. It clearly follows from (4)
and (5) for t = 1 that ^ c1 > 0. It also easily follows that ^ ck = 1. Obviously ^ ck  1. We also
cannot have ^ ck < 1, or else there will be positive measure of students unassigned, which
cannot occur since every student prefers each school to being unassigned and the measure
of all students coincide with the total capacity of schools.
Although it is possible for more than one school to have the same cuto, this is not
generic. If there are schools with the same cuto, we must have i 6= j 2 ^ St 1 for some t
and St 1 such that ^ ct
i = ^ ct
j, which entails a loss of dimension for m within M. Hence, the
Lebesque measure of the set of m's involving such a restriction is zero. It thus follows that
generically no two schools have the same cuto.
Proof of Lemma 4. For each i 2 S and any S0  S n fig, let
m
S0
i := (fv 2 Vjvj  vi  vk; 8j 2 S
0;8k 2 S n (S
0 [ fig)g)
be the measure of those students whose preference order of school i follows right after
schools in S0. (Note that the order of schools within S0 does not matter here.) We can
38then dene the conditions for cutos f~ c1;:::;~ cng under DA-MTB as the following system














(1   ~ cj)
#1
A = 1: (8)
The LHS has the measure of students admitted to school i, which consists of those who
prefer i the most and have a good draw for school i (i.e., !i  ~ ci), and those who prefer
schools S0, for any S0  S n fig, ahead of i but have bad draws in those schools and have
good draw for school i. In equilibrium, the cutos must be such that these aggregate
measures must equal one (the capacity of school i).
To show that there exists a set f~ c1;:::;~ cng of cutos satisfying the system of equations
(8), let  := (1;:::;n) : [0;1]n ! [0;1]n be a function whose i's component is dened as:

















where we adopt the convention that minf1
0;1g = 1.
Observe that self mapping () is a monotone increasing on a nonempty complete lattice.







n), and c  ~ c for any xed point ~ c.








j2S0(1   ~ c
j)
i  1; (9)
for each i 2 S. Suppose this is not the case for some i. Then, by the construction of the
mapping, we must have ~ c
i = 1. This means that all students are assigned to some schools.






















A = n: (10)



































































and, for school i for which (9) does not hold, ~ c









inequality contradicts (10). Since (9) holds for each i 2 S, the xed point (~ c
1;:::;~ c
n) solves
the system of equations (8). By the analogous logic, there must exist a worst school w with
~ cw = 1. As before, it follows that the solutions to (8) are generically distinct, which implies
that, for generic m, there is a single worst school.
To establish uniqueness, suppose to the contrary c > ~ c: c
j  ~ c
j for all j and c
i > ~ c
i
for some i. Let us denote the worst school under ~ c as w, i.e., ~ c
w = 1. By monotonicity
and the denition of cutos, w must be a worst school under c as well, i.e., c
w = 1. Since
























(1   ~ cj)
#1
A = 1;
which holds if and only if cj = ~ cj for all j.
Proof of Theorem 2. The proof is a direct application of Theorem 2 of Mas-Colell (1984).
Proof of Lemma 5. Part (i) follows trivially since such a student can target that school
and get assigned to it with probability one. To prove part (ii) consider any student of
type v, whose values are all distinct. There are -a.e. such v. Suppose her most-preferred
school 1(v) =: i is undersubscribed and not a worst school. It is then her best response
to target i, since doing so can guarantee assignment to i for sure, whereas targeting some
other school may result in assignment to some other school. Hence, the student must be
targeting i in equilibrium.
To prove part (iii), consider any v (with distinct values), such that 1(v) 6= w. Suppose
rst 
i(v) > 0 for some oversubscribed school i. It follows from the above observation
that her most preferred school must be an oversubscribed school (not necessarily i). Given
the distinct values, she must strictly prefer school i to all undersubscribed schools. Hence,
she lists i ahead of all undersubscribed schools in her ordinal list. Whenever she picks i,
she will fail to place in any oversubscribed schools other than i that she may list ahead
of i, so she will apply to school i with probability one. Suppose next 
j(v) > 0 for some
undersubscribed school j. Then, the student must prefer j to all other undersubscribed
schools, so she will apply to j with probability one whenever she fails to place in any
oversubscribed school she may list ahead of j in the ordinal list. Whenever she targets j,
she is surely rejected by all oversubscribed schools she may list ahead of j, so she will apply
to j with probability one. We thus conclude that (v) =  (v) for -a.e. v.
40Proof of Theorem 5: Proof of Part (i) builds on that of part (ii), so it will appear last.
Throughout, we let K and J be the sets of over- and under-subscribed schools.
Part (ii): Let () be an equilibrium, and let () be the ex ante allocation induced



















We rst prove that (v) solves [P(v)]. This is trivially true for any v with 1(v) = w
since xi = 
i(v) = 0;i 2 K must hold by Lemma 3 (ii). Based on this observation, in the
rest of the proof, we will restrict attention to students whose most preferred school is not
the worst school.
Consider now any x 2 K
(v) satisfying the constraint of [P(v)], and suppose a type
v-student faces all others playing their parts of the equilibrium strategies  under the
original CADA game. Consider a strategy called si in which she targets school i 2 S
and submits it as her top choice in her ordinal list, and but submits truthful ordinal list










If i 2 J, this probability is one. If i 2 K, then she will be rejected by school i with positive
probability. In that event, she will pass through the DA process according to her true
ordinal preferences, and will be assigned based on her non-target draw of score !2. Since
she will never be assigned to any other schools in K, she will only be assigned to a school
in J. Which school in J she is assigned to is determined solely by !2 (holding xed the
student's ordinal rankings), and her draw of !2 is independent of her draw of !1 (which
determined her assignment to i). Hence, the conditional probability of a student getting
assigned to j 2 J, is the same, regardless of which oversubscribed school i 2 K turned him














Suppose now the type v student randomizes by choosing \strategy si" with probability


















41for each j 2 J. Observe yj  0 for all j 2 S. This is obvious for j 2 K. For j 2 J, this













































where the rst inequality is implied by Lemma 3-(iii), the third equality holds since x 2
K

































































































The third equality holds since
P
i2J  
i(v) = 1, the fourth is implied by Lemma 5-(iii), and

































































































i(v) by playing a strategy available in the CADA game. Since () solves the
CADA game and is still feasible in more constrained problem [P(v)], it must solve [P(v)].
Moreover, since  is atomless and [P(v)] has a linear objective function on a convex set,
(v) must be the unique solution to [P(v)] for -a.e. v.
We prove the statement of the theorem by contradiction. Suppose to the contrary that
there exists an allocation () 2 X K
 that Pareto dominates (). Then, for -a.e. v, (v)
must either solve [P(v)] or violate the constraint. For -a.e. v, the solution to [P(v)] is









for -a.e. v. Further, there must exist a set A  V with (A) > 0 such that each student








i(v); 8v 2 A: (12)






















Now since () 2 X, for each i 2 S,
Z


















which contradicts (13). We thus conclude that  is Pareto optimal within K.








pixi  1: (14)
When we have only one undersubscribed school, called school n, the allocation xn is
completely pinned down by the allocation among n   1 oversubscribed schools, that is,




Therefore, an allocation x 2  is feasible in CADA game if (and only if) (14) holds.
















Since () solves less constrained problem [P(v)] and is still feasible in [P
0
(v)], it must
be an optimal solution for [P
0
(v)]. The rest of the proof is shown by the same argument
as in Part (ii).
Part (i): The argument in the text already established that the allocation cannot admit
a trading cycle that includes both oversubscribed and unsubscribed schools. It cannot admit
a trading cycle comprising only oversubscribed schools, since the allocation is PE within
these schools, by Part (ii), making it OE within the schools, by Lemma 2-(ii). It cannot
admit a trading cycle comprising only undersubscribed schools, since the logic of Theorem
3-(i) implies that it is OE within undersubscribed schools. Since the allocation cannot
admit any trading cycle, it must be OE.
Proof of Lemma 6. We can show that, if a school j > 1 is oversubscribed, then school
j 1 is oversubscribed. (Those who targeted j should have picked j, giving a contradiction.)
44It then suces to show that at least schools f1;2g are oversubscribed. Suppose not.
Then, only school 1 is oversubscribed in equilibrium. Suppose mass m2 < 1 of students
target school 2; and all other mass n   m2 target school 1. (No student targets school
j > 2, since targeting school 2 will guarantee enrollment, which dominates targeting any
school j > 2.) Pick any student with v such that
Pn
i=1 vi
n < v2. If the student picks school























which is less than v2. Hence, all such students must be targeting 2. Since there is more
than unit mass of such students, school 2 cannot be undersubscribed, which contradicts
the hypothesis that only school 1 is oversubscribed.
Proof of Theorem 6: Consider rst a DA algorithm with any random tie-breaking. Since
all students submit the same rank order over schools, they all must be assigned to each








) for all v:
Consider now CADA algorithm. Let (v) 2  be the equilibrium mixed strategy








of students target i 2 S in equilibrium. The equilibrium induces a mapping ' : S 7! ,
whereby a student is assigned to school j with probability '
j(i) if she targets i.







j(i) = 1: (16)
That is, a measure 
i of students target i, and a fraction '
j(i) of those is assigned to school
j. Summing the product over all i then gives the measure of students assigned to j, which
must equal its capacity, 1.
Consider a student with any arbitrary v 2 V. Suppose she randomizes in her auxiliary




























where the second equality follows from (16). That is, she can replicate the same ex ante
assignment with the randomization strategy as DA(v). Hence, the student must be at
least weakly better from CADA.
Proof of Theorem 8: Part (i) is precisely the same as Part (i) of Theorem 5 and is
the consequence of Part (ii) below and Part (ii) of Lemma 2 (which does not depend on
whether the students are naive or not). Hence it is omitted. To prove Part (ii), it is useful
to establish the following lemma. As before, let  denote the ex ante allocation arising
from the CADA game and let K and J = SnK be respectively the sets of oversubscribed
and undersubscribed schools in equilibrium.
Lemma 7. Any reassignment of (v) within K will make a naive student with v strictly
worse o, for almost every v.
Proof: Consider a naive student with v. Assume without loss of generality that she
prefers i strictly over all other schools (i.e., vi > vj, 8j 6= i). (This is without loss of
generality since the values are distinct for almost every student type.) Since the student is
naive, she subscribes to school i with probability 1. If school i is undersubscribed, then the
result is trivial since 
k(v) = 0 for all k 2 K. Hence, suppose school i is oversubscribed.







Since vi > vj 8j 6= i, for any x 2 K
(v), x 6= 









which implies that the student must be strictly worse o from any such reassignment. k
We are now ready to prove Parts (ii) and (iii):
Part (ii): We make use of the proof of Theorem 5. By Lemma N, a type-v naive
student's assignment from the CADA, (v), is a unique solution to [P(v)], for a.e. v,








46Since (v) is feasible under (17), this must be a unique solution to [P(v)].
For a non-naive student with a.e. v, the proof of Theorem 5 follows directly, so (v),
is also a unique solution of [P(v)]. Since the equilibrium assignment of both types solves
[P(v)], the rest of the argument in the proof of Theorem 5 applies, proving that we  is
PE within K. k
Part (iii): Again let  be the ex ante allocation arising from CADA. Suppose to the
contrary that there exists a within-K [ flg reallocation ~  of  that Pareto dominates .
By Part (ii),  is PE within K, so ~ l(v) 6= 
l(v) for a positive measure of v, which in
turn implies that there exists a set A  V with (A) > 0 such that ~ l(v) > 
l(v) for each















j(v) for all v 2A.
Assume without loss that v satises vi > vj for all i 2 K and for all j 6= i. (i 6= l since
~ l(v) > 


















































Since this inequality holds for almost every v 2 A, and since (A) > 0, ~  cannot Pareto
dominate .
Appendix C: Simulations
There are 5 schools each with a capacity of 20 seats and 100 students. Fix . We indepen-
dently draw 100 sets of vNM values for students. Let f~ vs
ijg denote a draw of vNM values,
where superscript s denote the draw and ~ vs
ij denotes student i's vNM value for school j.













47Given a normalized draw fvs
ijg, x the mechanism, dene the following: ps
ij is the
probability that student i is assigned school j under the mechanism. s
k(i) is the school
that is ranked k-th in i's preference list. P s is the set of popular schools. Os is the set of
oversubscribed schools in an equilibrium of CADA with no naive players.





































1 is the average probability of assigning a student to her rst choice.
In the CADA experiments with naive players, we divide the set of students into two: N
is the set of naive players who always target their rst choice, and S is the set of strategically
sophisticated players who play their best response strategies given others' strategies. We
calculate utilitarian welfare as before. We also compute the number of students targeting
their k-th choice in equilibrium, which we denote by T s
k, k 2 f1;2;3;4g.
Given a draw fvs
ijg; the set P s is determined trivially. Next we describe how the other
numbers are computed.
A single tie breaker is a list of 100 randomly drawn lottery numbers, one for each
student. Under DA-STB the ties at a school are broken according to students' single
random numbers. In CADA, we draw two single tie breakers, one to be used to break ties
at one's target school, the other to be used at one's other schools. A multiple tie breaker
is a list of 100  5 = 500 randomly drawn numbers, one for each student at each school.
Under DA-MTB, the ties at a school are broken according to students' tie breaker numbers
at that school.
For each draw fvs
ijg; we independently draw 2,000 single tie breakers for DA-STB, and
an additional set of 2,000 single tie breakers for CADA, and 2,000 multiple tie breakers for
DA-MTB. Then ps
ij for a mechanism is computed by
Number of tie breakers at which i is assigned j
2;000
:
The equilibrium of CADA is computed with single tie breakers being xed. Given the
strategies of other students, a student's best response is found by computing that student's
expected utility over those tie breakers. Then Os; the set of oversubscribed schools, is
48found by using students's equilibrium target schools. In experiments with naive players,
naive players' target schools are xed at their rst choice.
Note that we are approximating the equilibrium by drawing (two sets of) 2,000 indepen-
dent tie-breakers. The exact numbers are computed by considering 100! single tie-breakers
and (100!)5 multiple tie breakers, which is beyond the capabilities of our computational re-
sources. Any further increase in the number of tie breakers beyond 2,000 does not increase
the precision of our computations signicantly.














Note that we drop all \s" from a variable to denote its mean over 100 iterations of an
experiment. We report 100 v
vFB in our welfare gures.
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